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SEARCH OF A MOTOR VEHICLE INCIDENT
TO A TRAFFIC ARREST: THE OUTLOOK
AFTER ROBINSON AND GUSTAFSON
I. INTRODUCTION
In the companion cases of United States v. Robinson,, and
Gustafson v. Florida,2 the United States Supreme Court held that a
full field search of the person of an arrestee may be made incident to
an arrest for a traffic violation even if the arresting officer had no
reason to believe that the arrestee was armed, or even if in fact the
police officer believed that the offender was not armed.3
Left unanswered by the Court was the question whether a
search without probable cause of the arrestee's vehicle could be justi-
fied as incident to an arrest for a minor traffic offense. Among the
first state appellate courts to consider the question, after the decisions
in Robinson and Gustafson were handed down, were the appellate
court of Illinois, First District, the Supreme Court of Indiana, and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In People v. Cannon4 and
Frasier v. State' the first two courts held that a search of the vehicle
was authorized by the decisions in Robinson and Gustafson.' In
Wilson v. State,7 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, over a vigor-
ous dissent by Judge Douglas, held that Robinson and Gustafson did
not justify a search of the vehicle of a traffic offender. 8
Unfortunately, none of the three courts saw fit to explain why it
felt that Robinson and Gustafson did or did not extend to searches
of the arrestee's vehicle. Both the Supreme Court of Indiana and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals limited themselves to mere declara-
tions of the applicability of Robinson and Gustafson.9 While Cannon
did suggest that an extension of the two cases to a search of the
vehicle of the arrestee was made necessary by the need to protect the
1 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
2 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
3 414 U.S. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
18 Il1. App. 3d 781, 310 N.E.2d 673 (1974).
- Ind. ., 312 N.E.2d 77 (1974).
£ 18 IIl. App. 3d at 784, 310 N.E.2d at 376; __ Ind. at _, 312 N.E.2d at 80. The
Indiana decision drew a sharp dissent from Justice De Breuler.
511 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Id. at 533.
"We do not decide whether there was probable cause for the police officer to search the
vehicle for the reason we decide this issue pursuant to Gustafson v. Florida." - Ind. at..
312 N.E.2d at 80. "We do not find the recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Gustafson v. Florida. . . to be applicable to the facts in the instant case." 511 S.W.2d at 533
n.l.
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safety of the arresting officer, the court failed to elaborate on its basic
position.'"
The issue of whether a search of an automobile may be made
incident to a traffic arrest is not a new one. The appellate courts of
virtually every state, as well as many of the federal courts of appeal,
have ruled on the question." While many of the earlier decisions on
the subject allowed a search of the vehicle, the more modern decisions
in the area definitively rejected allowing a search of the vehicle based
solely on a traffic arrest. It is the thesis of this note that even though
the rationales underlying Robinson and Gustafson are quite reminis-
cent of the reasoning in many of the early state cases allowing a
search of an automobile incident to a traffic arrest, a search of the
person of the arrestee is still distinguishable from a search of his
vehicle. The note will also explore the question whether, given the
present alignment on the Supreme Court, the Court is likely to draw
such a distinction. Finally, some of the dangers inherent in extending
the scope of a search incident to a traffic arrest to the offender's
vehicle will be discussed.
II. THE EARLY CASES
Before 1960 most courts which considered the question whether
it was permissible for police officers to search the vehicle of a person
arrested for a minor traffic offense usually found the searches to be
valid. In general, the cases took an extremely mechanistic approach
to the matter12 applying the following rationale: if the traffic arrest
was valid, and the search was "incident" in time and place to the
traffic arrest, then the search was valid."
Another and to some extent more convincing rationale was later
developed, mainly in dissenting opinions, when the tide began to turn
against allowing searches incident to traffic arrests. This was the
police protection rationale, i.e. that the search was justified by the
necessity of protecting the safety of the arresting officers.'
The proponents of this view believed that the safety of the police
10 18 Ill. App. 3d at 785, 310 N.E.2d at 676.
11 E. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 307-10 (1970). Annot., 10 A.L.R. 3d 314 (1966);
Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis L.J. 506, 512 n.35
(1961); Comment, Search Incident to Arrest and the Automobile, 43 Miss. L.J. 196, 211 n. 64
(1972).
'2 Comment, Search Incident to Arrest and the Automobile, 43 Miss. L.J. 196,210 (1972).
" People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 18, 166 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1960); Simeone, supra note
11, at 512.
" E.g., Paxton v. State, 255 Ind. 264, 278, 263 N,E.2d 636, 643 (1970) (Arterbum, J.,
dissenting), State v. Meeks, 467 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Mo. 1971) (Holman, J., dissenting), Wilson v.
State, 511 S.W.2d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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officer was an absolute value, and that any intrusion into an individ-
ual's right of privacy which occurred as a result of making a search
incident to a traffic arrest had to be tolerated in light of the overriding
goal of protecting the police officer. The case for allowing searches
incident to traffic arrests was often stated in strongly emotional
terms. As one supporter of the "right" to search incident to traffic
arrests wrote:
If the [view that a traffic arrest does not automatically justify an
incidental search of the vehicle] were adopted,who would be willing
to tell the widow of the dead police officer that he was killed because
a narrow view of the Constitution deprived him of one of the means
he traditionally had for the purpose of protecting himself. . . .But
where the law has authorized arrest, the life of the arresting officer
should be treated as being more sacred than the alleged right of the
person lawfully arrested to be free from embarrassment, and the
officer should be permitted the best method of protecting himself
-the traditional right to search incident to a lawful arrest.'
While most of the state appellate courts allowed a search of the
vehicle incident to a traffic arrest, 6 there was no unanimity on the
permissible scope of such searches. Some courts allowed a "stem to
stern" search of the automobile. 7 Other courts, particularly those
relying on the police protection rationale, would limit the search to
the passenger compartment of the vehicle, disallowing any search of
the trunk on the grounds that the police officer could not possibly be
in danger from a weapon hidden in that part of the vehicle.'"
III. THE MODERN CASES
A major break in the adherence of state and federal courts to a
rule allowing a search of the vehicle and person of a traffic arrestee
came in 1960 when the Supreme Court of Illinois handed down deci-
sions in the companion cases of People v. Watkins"9 and People v.
Mayo."0 In Watkins the police sought to justify their search of the
person of the driver of an automobile as incident to his arrest for
parking too close to a crosswalk .2 In Mayo the police claimed that
15 Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic Violations-A Reply to Professor
Simeone, 7 ST. Louis L.J. 17 n.18, 90 (1962).
" Simeone, supra note 11, at 512.
'7 Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967).
's See Brinegar v. State, 97 Okl. Cr. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); McCurdy v. State, 42 Ala.
App. 646, 176 So. 2d 53 (1965).
" 19 IIl. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
19 II1. 2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
2119 Ill. 2d at 19, 166 N.E.2d at 437.
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their search of the glove compartment of a vehicle was permissible
as incident to the arrest of the driver on a charge of parking too far
from the curb.22
The Illinois court rejected both contentions holding that absent
special circumstances the mere fact of a traffic arrest justified neither
a search of the person of the arrestee, nor a search of his vehicle.2
As Justice Schaefer wrote:
The critical issue in each case must be whether the situation that
confronted the officer justified the search. . . .A uniform rule per-
mitting a search in every case of a valid arrest, even for minor traffic
violations, would greatly simplify our task and that of law enforce-
ment officers. But such an approach would preclude consideration
of the reasonableness of any particular search, and so would take
away the protection that the constitution is designed to pro-
vide. . . .A search incident to arrest is authorized when it is rea-
sonably necessary to protect the arresting officer from attack, to
prevent the prisoner from escaping, or to discover fruits of a
crime. . . .But when no more is shown than a car was parked too
close to a crosswalk or too far from a curb, the constitution does
not permit a policeman to search the driver.24
An increasing number of state courts and numerous federal
courts of appeal began to follow the lead of the Illinois Supreme
Court, viewing searches based only upon a traffic arrest as constitu-
tionally prohibited general exploratory searchesY.2 In the process of
creating a new rule, these state and federal courts also developed a
much more sophisticated concept of "incidentality." A search was no
longer "incident" to an arrest merely because it was made at the same
time and place as the arrest, but because it was in some way related
to the primary purpose of the arrest.26 The courts following the new
trend, while not denying the desirability of protecting the police from
physical assault, felt that the risk to police officers was minimal in
minor traffic arrests (especially in cases where the circumstances gave
the police no reason to believe that the suspect was armed) when
compared with the potential invasion of fourth amendment rights?
As Judge Skelly Wright put it,
We are not unmindful of the tragic fact that in this country in the
period between July 1, 1970 and June 30, 1971, 6 police officers died
and 92 others were injured in the course of making traffic ar-
2 19 Il1. 2d at 138, 166 N.E.2d at 441.
21 19 I1. 2d at 19, 166 N.E.2d at 437; 19 Ill. 2d at 138, 166 N.E.2d at 441.
24 19 IIl. 2d at 18-19; 166 N.E.2d at 436-37.
21 State v. Meeks, 467 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Mo. 1971).
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rests. . . These statistics, however, must be placed in proper
perspective. Considering the millions of traffic arrests made an-
nually, the fact remains that these arrests constitute possibly the
safest of all law enforcement activities.2
By the late 1960's the clear weight of case authority had shifted
toward not allowing searches incident to traffic arrests. 9 The view
that a traffic arrest alone could not justify a search of the person or
the vehicle of the arrestee had even filtered down to the level of law
enforcement agencies. 0 However, now that Watkins and its progeny
prohibiting searches of the person of the arrestee incident to a traffic
arrest have been overruled by Robinson and Gustafson, at least inso-
far as they rested upon federal constitutional grounds,31 the underly-
ing rationales developed in those cases are now subject to serious
doubt. There is little question that on the basis of Robinson and
Gustafson a police officer may search the person of one he custodially
arrests for a traffic violation." Whether the scope of such a search
may extend to the arrestee's vehicle is still an open question, particu-
larly in light of the lack of a United States Supreme Court decision
on the issue and the reluctance of state appellate courts to go beyond
mere declarations of the applicability or non-applicability of
Robinson and Gustafson to searches of the vehicle.
2 Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 317 (5th Cir. 1968).
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
" Id. at 1097 n.22.
23 B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 392
(1973).
3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANUAL ON THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 42
(1972).
3, Of course, a state appellate court remains free to interpret its own state constitutional
provisions in such a way as to preclude a search of the person of a traffic arrestee, or his vehicle.
This was done by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in the case of State v. Kaluna, - Haw.
-, 520 P.2d 51 (1974). Another means of attack on the search would be to challenge the
validity of the underlying arrest since if the arrest is an illegal seizure of the person, any fruits
of the arrest, including anything found.in the course of an incidental search, is inadmissible as
evidence. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion in Gustafson, suggested that it might be a violation of fourteenth amendment due
process for the police to make a custodial arrest for a minor traffic violation. 414 U.S. at 266-
67. In the case of People v. Copland, 77 Misc. 2d 649, 354 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
Co. 1974), a New York court supressed evidence found during the course of a search of the
person of a traffic offender on the ground that the state legislature did not authorize the police
to make custodial arrests in cases of minor traffic violations. The court did, however, go on to
cite Justice Stewart's argument in Gustafson as an alternative basis for its holding.
U I J. VARON SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES (Addendum) 1-5 passim (1974).
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IV. Robinson AND Gustafson: THEIR APPLICABILITY TO A SEARCH
OF THE ARRESTEE'S VEHICLE
While it is true that the fact situations in Robinson and
Gustafson involved only a search of the person of the arrestee,3 the
themes developed in the majority opinions in the two cases have great
potential for undermining the rationales developed in the more mod-
ern decisions on search of the vehicle incident to a traffic arrest.3
There were three opinions in Robinson: the majority opinion written
by Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun, White and Stewart; a concurring opinion by Justice
Powell; and a dissenting opinion written by Justice Marshall, joined
by Justices Douglas and Brennan. The alignment of the Court was
the same in Gustafson except for a brief concurring opinion by Justice
Stewart.
The majority opinions in Robinson and Gustafson rest on two
fundamental propositions. The first is that a full field search of a
person custodially arrested for a traffic offense is "reasonable" be-
cause it is "incident" to the arrest. 5 As Justice Rehnquist wrote,
It is well settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is a tradi-
tional exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment. . . . The validity of the search of a person incident to a
lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from its first enunciation,
and has remained unchallenged until the present case."6
Justice Rehnquist went on to quote the following passage from
Agnello v. United States:37
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an
escape, is not to be doubted.u
-" 414 U.S. at 236; 414 U.S. at 266.
3, One state appellate court, the Missouri supreme court, did draw a distinction between
the search of the vehicle and the search of the person, forbidding the former, while allowing
the latter. However the Missouri court seems to have drawn the distinction in the case of State
v. Meeks, 467 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. 1971) more in an effort to avoid overruling a previous case,
State v. Moody, 443 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1967), than in an effort to draw some sort of reasoned
distinction since the reasons, put forth in Meeks, for prohibiting the incidental search of a
traffic arrestee's vehicle have equal application to a search of his person.
414 U.S. at 224.
"Id.
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
31 Id. at 30; 414 U.S. at 225.
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The second fundamental proposition put forth in Robinson and
Gustafson is a definitive rejection of the idea that the risks to the
police officer in making a traffic arrest are so minimal as to make a
search of the suspect's person unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment.3 9 The Court not only rejected the contention that the dangers
to the police officer were minimal, but went on to say that the Court
would eschew any case-by-case consideration of the dangers to the
police officer.40 Hence, not only need there be no objective cause for
the police officer to believe that the traffic arrestee is armed before
searching his person, but even if the officer in fact subjectively be-
lieves that his prisoner is not carrying a concealed weapon on his
person, as was the case in both Robinson and Gustafson," he may
still conduct a full field search of the person of the arrestee for a
"weapon;" and any contraband or evidence of a crime found during
the search may be used against the arrestee under the currently opera-
tive "windfall" rule.42
The kinship between the underlying themes in Robinson and
Gustafson and the ideas developed in the early state cases on
searches of the vehicle incident to a traffic arrest is readily apparent.
The question is whether, given the two rationales, a search of the
vehicle of the arrestee can be distinguished from a search of his
person. If one adopts the purely mechanistic concept of "incidental-
ity" seemingly embodied in Robinson and Gustafson, then there is
little hope of distinguishing the two situations. At least one writer has
suggested that Robinson and Gustafson stand for the proposition that
once a custodial traffic arrest is made, there need be no underlying
justification, e.g., fear of the arrestee having a concealed weapon to
warrant making a search of the person; the very fact of the arrest
itself supplies the requisite justification.4 3 Such a legal theory would,
in essence, make the body of a person arrested for a traffic offense a
"free-fire zone" where the probable cause requirements of the fourth
amendment cease to apply. This zone of immunity from fourth
amendment protections easily could be extended to the entire passen-
414 U.S. at 234.
o Id. at 235; 414 U.S. at 266.
t 414 U.S. at 241 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 414 U.S. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Professor Anthony Amsterdam has suggested that the windfall rule be replaced by a
rule which would allow into evidence only that for which the police are supposed to searching,
e.g., in a protective "stop and frisk" search the prosecution would be allowed to introduce into
evidence any weapons found on the person of the defendant during the search, but not other
evidence such as drugs. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 434, 437 (1974).
" Note, U.S. v. Robinson-Scope Incident to Custodial Arrest for a Traffic Violation
Defined, 35 U. Prrr. L. REV. 864, 875 (1974).
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ger compartment of the automobile through the application of the
rules developed in Chimel v. California," i.e. the permissible scope
of an incidental search may extend to the person of the arrestee and
the area within his immediate control.4 5 Indeed, this was exactly what
was done by the court in People v. Cannon.6
However, there are some indications that the zone of immunity
concept would command the votes of only four members of the
Supreme Court: Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, White,
and Blackmun. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Edwards7 expressed his concern that an incidental search
bear some relation to the traditional justifications for this type of
warrantless action." As set out in Justice Stewart's frequently cited
opinion in Chimel v. California these justifications are: (a) to remove
any weapons that the arrestee might use in order to resist arrest or
to attempt to make an escape, and (b) to remove any evidence of the
crime from the control of the arrestee in order to prevent its destruc-
tion. 9 In a traffic arrest there is generally no evidence of the crime.50
The only possible rationale for an incidental search in a traffic arrest
situation is the protection of the police officer. This brings us to the
second point made by the majority opinions in Robinson and
Gustafson.
As mentioned previously, the majority in Robinson and
Gustafson held that a full field search of the person of the arrestee
was justified even though the arresting officers testified that they did
not fear the possibility of the suspect having a concealed weapon. 51
It is also clear from the facts in the two cases that the Court sanc-
tioned actions which went beyond those necessary to protect the offi-
cers from the threat of a concealed weapon. The Court's indulgence
in judicial "overkill" (in the form of the refusal to assess the dangers
to the police officer on a case-by-case basis, and its sanctioning of
unnecessary protective measures) may be explained in terms of the
" 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
11 Id. at 763.
46 18 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 310 N.E.2d at 80. The "lunging reach" rule of Chimel probably
would prohibit a search of the trunk of the automobile. See text accompanying note 63, infra.
This proposition was recognized by Judge Douglas in his dissent in Wilson, 511 S.W.2d at 539
n.2.
47 415 U.S. 800.
41 Id. at 810-11.
' 395 U.S. at 762-63.
Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1968). An interesting
exception occurs in the case of persons arrested for driving while intoxicated. Here it generally
has been held that the police may search for open bottles of liquor. Wellman v. United States,
414 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1969).
51 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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Court's perception of the dangers to police officers in general from
weapons hidden on the persons of those they custodially arrest for
traffic offenses. It is arguable that the gross dangers to the officer
from weapons hidden in the arrestee's vehicle is much smaller, and
hence, the overprotective approach adopted by the Court is not
needed.
As Justice De Brueler pointed out in his dissent in Frasier v.
State,5.3 the situations in Robinson and Gustafson both involved
"custodial" arrests, arrests in which the police officer took the sus-
pect into custody and transported him to the local jail in his police
car. 54 This particular type of arrest maximizes the danger from weap-
ons hidden on the person of the arrestee, while minimizing the danger
from weapons hidden in the arrestee's vehicle. Both the dissenting
judge in the court of appeals decision of United States v. Robinson,55
Judge Tamm, and the majority of the Supreme Court in its decision
of Robinson recognized that there are two elements which, when
combined, create a particularly volatile situation for the police officer
making a custodial arrest. One is the very fact of confrontation be-
tween the police officer and the suspect." The other, and in the case
of a possible search of the vehicle the more relevant, is the prolonged
period of contact between the officer and his prisoner.5 7 This contact
invariably takes place in the policeman's patrol car. While the suspect
is in the police car, the police officer, especially if he is alone, is highly
vulnerable to a sneak attack by the arrestee using a weapon concealed
upon his person. In contrast, the danger to the police officer from a
weapon hidden in the arrestee's automobile is nil since it would be
impossible for the arrestee to reach a weapon secreted in his own
vehicle while sitting in the arresting officer's police car.
Even in non-custodial arrest situations, there is considerable rea-
son to believe that a search of a traffic arrestee's vehicle would be
inefficacious in protecting the police officer from attack. As Profes-
sor Allen Bristow noted in his study of police officer shootings (a
report cited with approval by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in his opinion
in Robinson), there is a paucity of empirical studies on the dangers
52 In both cases, a frisk of the prisoners revealed cigarette packs. All that was necessary
to protect the police officers from weapons hidden in the package was for the officers to keep
the packs away from the arrestees. 414 U.S. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court
allowed the officers to open the packages and examine the contents.
S Ind. at , 312 N.E.2d at 84.
' 414 U.S. at 234-35; 414 U.S. at 265.
471 F.2d 1082, 1117 (D.C.Cir. 1972).
"Id.
Id.; 414 U.S. at 234-35.
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to the police officer in the course of making traffic arrests." However,
the statistics compiled by Professor Bristow indicate that a majority
of assaults on police officers making traffic arrests occur while the
officer is still seated in his own vehicle, or while the officer is ap-
proaching the suspect's vehicle.59 In a majority of cases, search of a
traffic arrestee's vehicle will not prevent an assault on a police officer.
The tactics used by the police in confronting traffic violators also
tend to minimize the utility of a vehicle search. The standard operat-
ing procedure of many police forces is to require the traffic offender
to get out of his car when being arrested by the police officer, espe-
cially if the officer harbors some suspicion about the person or per-
sons in the car." This tactic of forcing the suspect or suspects to alight
from the vehicle was used in the Cannon, Frasier, and Wilson cases."
Once the suspect is out of his car, the calculus of danger to the police
officer is radically changed.62 While the risk of an assault on the
officer through the means of a weapon hidden on the person of the
arrestee is arguably high, the risk of the arrestee using a weapon
hidden in his vehicle is concomitantly low, for the result of any sud-
den movement by the arrestee toward his vehicle is likely to be the
death or serious wounding of the suspect.
Once the suspect is out of his vehicle, constitutional limitations
on the right of the arresting officer to search the vehicle may come
into play. In Chimel, the Supreme Court limited the permissible
scope of any search incident to a valid arrest to the person of the
arrestee and the area within his immediate control.63 While Chimel
m Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P.S. 93
(1963), cited at 414 U.S. at 234 n. 5.
" Id.
" Some police manuals recommend that the police officer have the traffic offender remain
in his vehicle. V. FOLLEY, POLICE PATROL TECHNIQUES AND TACTICS 95 (1973). But see N.
CLOWERS, PATROLMAN PATTERNS, PROBLEMS, AND PROCEDURES 147 (1962). Whatever the best
procedure may be, the fact remains that the practice of police ordering suspected traffic viola-
tors out of their vehicles remains widespread. See note 61, infra.
", 18 Ill. App. 3d at 784, 310 N.E.2d at 676; - Ind. at _ , 312 N.E.2d at 79; 511
S.W.2d at 532.
11 At least one court opposed to automatically allowing a search of the vehicle incident to
a traffic arrest has, by way of dictum, suggested that when there is more than one person in
the automobile, the police ought to be allowed to search it for weapons, even after the driver is
removed. Fields v. State, 463 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970). The reasoning behind
this position is that even though the driver is outside the vehicle, any weapon concealed in the
vehicle is accessible to the passengers. While this rationale seems plausible, there is one major
flaw; ordering all the occupants to alight from the vehicle is a precondition to any search of
the vehicle. No sane police officer is going to attempt to make a search of a vehicle while it is
still occupied. The procedure is simply too dangerous. Once the police officer removes the
passengers in order to make the search, the danger which the Oklahoma court perceived
disappears.
395 U.S. at 763.
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itself dealt only with an incidental search of the arrestee's premises,
most state courts which have considered the question have been will-
ing to apply the scope limitations of Chimel to searches of automo-
biles. 4 When the suspect is out of his car, can any portion of the
interior of the car be said to be within his immediate control? At least
one court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has answered the question affirmatively, saying that as long as the
suspect was within "leaping range" of the interior of the car, a police
officer may conduct an incidental search of the automobile's inte-
rior. 5 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has taken a more
flexible approach. In Fields v. State"5 that court held that the question
whether the interior of an automobile is within the driver's immedi-
ate control once he has exited from the car must be answered by
considering the circumstances- of each individual case." An incidental
search of the vehicle of a traffic offender could not be made if the
police officer were securely restraining the arrestee (this presumably
would be done in any custodial arrest of the type involved in
Robinson and Gustafson), if the arrestee had left the vicinity of the
automobile, or if the doors of the automobile were closed and the
arrestee made no attempt to re-enter the vehicle.18
The Oklahoma court went even further in Lawson v. State,69
implying that in all cases where the offender is removed from his
vehicle, the interior of the vehicle is out of his reach. The court said:
Most certainly the officer is entitled to protect himself, but his
actions must be consistent with this purpose. After both defendants
were removed from the car, they were no longer able to employ any
weapon that might have been inside the vehicle. Certainly the inte-
rior of the bag on the back floor of the car was beyond the arrestee's
reach when they were outside the car.7"
Even if a rule such as the one advocated by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals were universally adopted, the police could still
circumvent it by making the actual "arrest" while the suspect was
still seated in his automobile. The police could then validly claim that
1 Note, The Effect of Chimel v. California on Automobile Search and Seizure, 23 OKLA.
L. REv. 447, 454 (1970); see cases listed at Lawson v. State, 484 P.2d 1337, 1340 n. 4, (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971). Accord, Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, - Mass. _, 317 N.E.2d 480,
482 (1974). Contra, State v. Carter, 54 N.J. 436, 255 A.2d 746 (1969).
Application of Kiser, 418 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969).
" 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970).
I d. at 1004.
'Id.
" 484 P.2d 1337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
70 Id. at 1341.
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the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle was within the arres-
tee's reach."
Allowing the police to search the vehicle may well bring about
the violent confrontation that an incidental search is designed to
avert. The driver with something to hide might be willing to risk an
assault upon an armed police officer if he were certain that his vehicle
would be searched with the consequent discovery of whatever he was
trying to conceal.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a search
of the vehicle incident to a traffic arrest would protect the police
officer. Professor Burton Agata has suggested that the officer might
be in danger from a weapon hidden in the car in the event that he
allowed the suspect to drive his own car back to the courthouse for
an appearance before a local magistrate.72 Professor Agata failed to
explain why the suspect would choose to attack an armed police
officer in a location where help is likely to be readily at hand in
preference to trying to make a "getaway" in the car he has at his
immediate disposal.
Another possible scenario was put forth by Judge Douglas of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in his dissent in Wilson. He hypoth-
esized that the police officer could conceivably be attacked with a
weapon hidden in the arrestee's vehicle after the officer returned to
the police car. According to Judge Douglas, the motivation for such
an attack would be the arrestee's fear of being subjected to an identity
check. 73 It is undoubtedly true that such a situation has occurred in
the pasty.7 However, two factors must be borne in mind. The first is
that in the custodial type of arrest involved in Robinson and
Gustafson, the suspect probably is going to be safely seated in the
police car by the time the officer makes an on-the-scene identity
check, if he ever makes one at all. The second is the availability of
less intrusive alternative measures for the protection of the police
officer, such as requiring the arrestee to remain outside his own
vehicle or inside the police officer's automobile while the identity
check is being made, or even a simple increase in vigilance on the part
71 Baker & Khourie, Improbable Cause: The Poisonous Fruits of a Search After Arrest
for a Traffic Violation, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 54, 63 (1972). A leading police text on patrol tactics
actually suggests that police officers use this technique. A. BRIsTow, FIELD INTERROGATION
95 (1964).
11 Agata, supra note 15, at 24.
13 511 S.W.2d at 538.
11 In fact, Professor Bristow lists the time while the police officer is talking on his radio
as the third most dangerous period for an officer during a confrontation with a traffic offender.
Bristow, supra, note 58.
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of the police officer. If a search of the vehicle incident to a traffic
arrest cannot be justified on the basis of protecting the police officer,
as the above discussion seems to indicate, then it is completely di-
vorced from the traditional underlying rationales for a warrantless
search incident to an arrest. The absence of these underlying justifica-
tions may very well sway Justice Stewart to vote against allowing the
police to search the vehicle of a person arrested for a traffic offense.
Even if Justice Stewart were to take a position against extending
the scope of searches incident to a traffic arrest to the vehicle of the
arrestee, that would still make only four justices voting against allow-
ing these searches. 75 The fifth and deciding vote is likely to be cast
by Justice Powell. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in
Robinson and Gustafson emphasized that when a person is arrested
all other violations of the privacy of his person, such as a full field
search, are unimportant by comparison. Yet Justice Powell specifi-
cally stated that, "an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial
arrest retains no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the
privacy of his person [emphasis supplied]. ' ' 76 Justice Powell did not
say that the individual loses his reasonable expectations of privacy in
other areas, e.g., the inside of his automobile. The majority opinion
in Edwards v. United States,7 approvingly cited the following lan-
guage from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
decision in United States v. De Leo:
While the legal arrest of a person should not destroy the privacy of
his premises, it does-for at least a reasonable time and to a reason-
able extent-take his own privacy out of the realm of protection
from police interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence.7
In contrast however, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, did say that "[tihe search of an
automobile is far less intrusive of the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment than the search of one's person or of a building. This
Court 'has long distinguished between the automobile and a home or
office.' -17 It does not necessarily follow from Justice Powell's analyt-
ical framework, placing the privacy of the automobile beneath the
privacy of the person and the privacy of one's premises, that the
interest in the privacy of the vehicle is not separable from that of the
11 Presumably, the three dissenters in Robinson and Gustafson, Marshall, Brennan, and
Douglas, would oppose allowing incidental searches of the vehicle in cases of traffic arrests.
414 U.S. at 237.
415 U.S. 800 (1974).
78 422 F.2d 487, 493 (Ist Cir. 1970), cited at 415 U.S. 808-09.
71 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973).
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person in the context of traffic arrests and therefore not deserving
protection. First, the assaults on personal privacy, automatically and
perhaps necessarily occasioned by arrest and incarceration,0 have no
effect on the arrestee's automobile per se. Second, given the lesser
danger to the police officer from weapons hidden in the vehicle of the
arrestee, as compared with weapons on the arrestee's person, it is
possible to argue that the underlying societal interest mentioned in
De Leo81 which necessitates the indignities to the privacy of the per-
son involved in an arrest, is not present in regard to a search of the
traffic arrestee's vehicle.
Another factor which might influence Justice Powell to reject
extending the search incident to a traffic arrest to the offender's
vehicle is his insistence that the requirements of the "warrants
clause" of the fourth amendment,8 including the requirement of
probable cause, be applied to all searches. As Justice Powell wrote
in his opinion in United States v. United States District Court,
Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures," the definition of "reasonable-
ness" turns, at least in part, on the more specific demands of the
warrants clause. Some have argued that "[t]he relevant test is...
whether a search was reasonable." This view, however, overlooks
the second clause of the Amendment. The warrants clause of the
Fourth Amendment is not dead language."
Justice Powell may look askance at a warrantless search of a vehicle
for weapons, without probable cause, especially if there is no auto-
matic destruction of the occupant's expectation of privacy in the
vehicle.
There is no way of telling with certainty which way Justice Pow-
ell will vote if the issue of search of the vehicle incident to a traffic
arrest comes before the Court. All that can be predicted is that in any
80 An example of the supposedly socially necessary and automatic invasion of privacy of
the arrestee is the generally recognized right of the police to inventory the clothing and personal
effects an arrestee has with him at the time of his arrest. J. ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 151 (1971). The incarcerated arrestee is subject to a vast number
of horrible affronts, both official and unofficial, to his individual right of privacy of his person
while he is in jail. See generally, J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNIsHMaENT (1973).
" DeLeo, supra, at note 78.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
- 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972). It is interesting to note that Justice Rehnquist, in his opinions
in Robinson and Gustafson, ignores the requirements of the "warrants clause" completely, and
assumes that the only standard by which a search incident to arrest is to be judged is that of
"reasonableness." 414 U.S. at 235, 264.
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Supreme Court test of the issue, Justice Powell is likely to continue
his now familiar role in search and seizure questions as the key
"swing" vote.84
V. DANGERS IN EXTENDING THE Robinson/Gustafson
RATIONALE To SEARCHES OF THE VEHICLE
There are many problems which arise when the police are al-
lowed to make a full field search of the person of the arrestee incident
to a custodial traffic arrest. The most perplexing legal problems to
come to the fore because of the Robinson/Gustafson rule is how to
handle claims of "pretextuous" arrests. A "pretextuous" or "timed"
arrest is an arrest made for the sole purpose of conducting an inciden-
tal search. Empirical studies have shown that police officers have
"more than occasionally" used traffic arrests as a pretext for making
a search of the vehicle, particularly when they suspect that illegal
drugs are concealed within the car. 5 The fruits of these pretextuous
arrests have generally been subjected to the exclusionary rule.8 1
There are two possible ways of dealing with claims of pretex-
tuous arrests. One is to look into the mind of the arresting officer.
This approach has been rightly criticized as leading courts into a
highly speculative realm. As Judge Wisdom noted in his opinion in
Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, a far superior way of dealing
with pretextuous arrests is to insist that the police have "search-type"
probable cause in every search they undertake. Now that the police
no longer need "search-type" probable cause to conduct a full field
search of a person custodially arrested for a traffic offense, reviewing
courts must fall back on an examination of the police officer's sub-
jective state of mind in order to determine if a pretextuous arrest was
made.
In addition, several practical dangers may arise from the appli-
cation of the Robinson/Gustafson rule. One of these is a vast increase
in the number of custodial traffic arrests. Police officers are generally
" An interesting illustration of the pivotal role played by Justice Powell in search and
seizure cases is his position in the case of Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). In that case
the issue was whether a warrantless search and seizure of the automobile of an arrestee was
justified in spite of the fact that the police had ample time to procure a warrant. The Court
split 4 to 4 on the issue. However, the appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied
because Justice Powell voted with the four upholding the validity of the search on the grounds
that such issues should not be raised in collateral federal habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 596
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell gave no indication of his views on the merits of the case.
" Heller, A Conflict of Laws: Drug Possession and the Fourth Amendment, 26 OKLA. L.
REV. 317, 335-36 (1972).
u McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir. 1950).
- 391 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1968).
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given vast "on-the-street" discretion in dealing with traffic offend-
ers.s They may (a) let the offender go with only a warning, (b) issue
a summons or traffic ticket to the offender, or (c) make a full cus-
todial arrest of the offender. At the moment, a custodial arrest is a
condition precedent to an incidental search. 9 Rather than letting the
offender go with just a warning or a summons, the police might now
make a full custodial arrest in order to conduct an incidental search.
Other problems arising from allowing searches incident to traffic
arrests include-the use of such searches as devices for harassing unpo-
pular groups within a community, and the use of traffic arrests as a
pretext for stopping and searching persons the police regard as suspi-
cious."0
All the dangers that have been suggested as arising because of a
rule allowing searches of the person incident to a traffic arrest apply
with equal force to allowing searches of the vehicle. The automobile
is still a protected zone of privacy under the fourth amendment. As
Justice Stewart has said, "[t]he word automobile is not a talisman in
whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disap-
pears.""1 To allow a warrantless search of the vehicle, without proba-
ble cause, would be to allow further invasions of the rights of privacy
which the fourth amendment was designed to protect.
Allowing these searches would intensify all the problems con-
nected with searches of the person incident to a traffic arrest. The
prime deterrents to the police searching the person and the vehicle
of every traffic offender they halt (aside from the exclusionary rule
which would be lifted if the Robinson/Gustafson rule were to be
extended to a search of the vehicle) is the time such actions would
take, and the community hostility they would engender. Balanced
against the constraints of time and ill-feeling on the part of the com-
munity is the possibility of finding evidence of a more serious crime,
and being able to make a successful arrest of a suspect in that crime,
u 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" The Court specifically left the question whether a non-custodial arrest could justify an
incidental search for another day. 414 U.S. at 236 n. 6.
0 Suspicious person statutes, which allowed the police to arrest and thereby search and
question those whom they deemed to be "acting suspiciously," are no longer constitutional.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1971). The same end can be achieved,
however, through the use of traffic statutes, for it is virtually impossible for anyone to drive
a car without violating one of the myriad of traffic regulations on the book of a particular
jurisdiction. GEORGE, note 29 supra, at 384. For an interesting illustration of how traffic
statutes can serve as substitutes for the now unconstitutional suspicious person laws, see Hamp-
ton v. State, 511 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
", Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
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thus fulfilling the institutional goal of the police force. 2 If the Court
were to extend the permissible scope of a search incident to a cus-
todial traffic arrest, then the chances of the police finding "some-
thing" which would lead to an arrest for a more serious offense would
be proportionally increased, making it more worthwhile for the police
to engage in such intrusions into privacy. The impact of this type of
extension would be most noticeable among racial minorities and
other unpopular groups, e.g., "penniless wanderers and hippie
drivers. ' '" 3 Here, time is the only significant deterrent to continual
police searches since community feelings are not only unlikely to be
outraged by constant searches of these persons, but may well be
soothed by this type of police action against groups considered
undesirable. 4
VI. CONCLUSION
While the reasoning underlying United States v. Robinson and
Gustafson v. Florida is in some ways a throw-back to the rationales
behind many of the early state cases allowing a search of the vehicle
incident to a traffic arrest, there are adequate grounds for distinguish-
ing between a search of the person and a search of his vehicle.
Whether the Court will choose to do so remains an open question.
In any Supreme Court test on the matter, the votes of Justices Stew-
art and Powell are likely to be crucial. The three dissenters in
Robinson and Gustafson must be able to "swing" both Justice Powell
and Justice Stewart over to their side in order to prevent the scope
of a search incident to a custodial traffic arrest from being extended
from the person of the arrestee to his vehicle.
Harry S. Gerla
" A former Los Angeles Deputy Police Commissioner described the view of the arrest as
the "essence" of police work as follows:
[T]o the uniformed police officer who represents the backbone of the police force,
the making of an arrest is the "guts" of "police work." The making of a "good"
arrest is one of his most personally rewarding experiences. . . . He receives approval
from his peers and sometimes official recognition from those who evaluate his per-
formance and influence his professional future. He believes that the arrest of the
guilty is the most effective method of deterring crime, protecting citizens, and provid-
ing a sense of security to the residents of the community.
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